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Abstract
To solve the spectrum scarcity problem, the cognitive radio technology
involves licensed users and unlicensed users. A fundamental issue for the
network users is whether it is better to act as a licensed user by using a
primary network or an unlicensed user by using a secondary network. To
model the network selection process by the users, the deterministic repli-
cator dynamics is often used, but in a less practical way that it requires
each user to know global information on the network state for reaching a
Nash equilibrium. This paper addresses the network selection process in
a more practical way such that only noise-prone estimation of local infor-
mation is required and, yet, it obtains an efficient system performance.
Keywords – cognitive radio networks, network selection, population
games, replicator dynamics, Markov chains
1 Introduction
Cognitive radio (CR) is a promising technology to solve the spectrum scarcity
problem [1]. In CR networks, primary users (PUs) have licenses to operate in a
certain spectrum band whereas secondary users (SUs) have no spectrum licenses
and need to share the spectrum holes left available by PUs without interfering
with them. In this paper, we focus on a fundamental issue of whether it is better
for a CR user to act as a PU with guaranteed quality-of-service at a higher price
or an SU with degraded quality-of-service at a lower price. Ref. [2] addresses this
network selection problem by the deterministic evolutionary dynamics based
on replicator equations, assuming that each CR user dynamically adjusts its
network selection. Although it would lead to the Nash equilibrium of network
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traffic yielding an efficient system performance, the approach is less practical in
the sense that it assumes each of CR users to know the exact global information
on the network state. In this paper, we address the network selection problem in
a more realistic way, assuming that each CR user only needs to know error-prone
local information.
2 Network Models & Equilibrium Computation
As in [2], we consider a CR system consisting of a primary network and a
secondary network with a population of CR users, where the secondary network
coexists with the primary one at the same location and on the same spectrum
band. Once the primary and secondary operators set the prices of network
subscription, each of the CR users dynamically chooses the network to use. The
wireless channel is modelled as an M |M |1 queue with the service rate (i.e. the
maximum achievable transmission rate) C and the arrival rate λ. The cost
−piP (or utility piP ) perceived by a PU is a combination of the service delay
experienced in the network and the price to access this network,
− piP = α
C − λP + p1 =
α
C − λxP + p1 (1)
where λP denotes the overall transmission rate of PUs, α a weighting parameter
of delay with respect to the network subscription price p1 charged by the primary
network operator, and xP ∈ [0, 1] the frequency or population share of PUs. The
cost −piS by an SU is
− piS = α
C − λ + p2 (2)
where p2 denotes the price charged by the secondary network operator. PUs
and SUs experiencing the same cost, the equilibrium traffic λ∗P for the primary
network is
λ∗P =
αλ− C(C − λ)(p1 − p2)
α− (C − λ)(p1 − p2) . (3)
See Ref. [2] for the justification of the cost functions as well as the derivation of
the prices and the equilibrium traffic.
3 Critical Review of Applications of Replicator
Dynamics
Even if there exists the equilibrium traffic that yields an efficient system perfor-
mance, it is a different matter whether CR users can reach the equilibrium. For
the latter, Ref. [2] models the network selection process of CR users according
to replicator dynamics, where users individually adjust their selection based on
the observed network state.
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3.1 Replicator Dynamics
Originating from evolutionary biology, the replicator dynamics describes how
the frequency of individuals using a strategy in a population changes over time
under the natural selection [3]. Given a population of ni individuals using strat-
egy i ∈ {1, . . . , I}, the replicator dynamics is described with a set of ordinary
differential equations
dxi
dt
= Kxi (pii(x)− p¯i(x)) (4)
where xi = ni/
∑I
j=1 nj is the frequency of individuals using strategy i, K a
constant, x = (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xI) the population state, pii(x) the (expected)
utility of strategy i, and p¯i(x) =
∑I
i=1 xipii(x) the population mean of utility.
According to Eq. 4, the frequency xi increases when its utility is larger than the
population mean and it decreases when its utility is lower than the mean.
The replicator dynamics leads the population of individuals to a Nash equi-
librium. Because of this favourable feature, the replicator equations have been
widely applied to describe individuals to adaptively adjust their strategies over
time and reach a Nash equilibrium in problems related to CR networks [2, 4, 5].
In this setting, strategy i is analogous to a strategy of, say, choosing network i.
These applications interpret the replicator equations as the description of how
each of individuals should behave. According to this interpretation, however,
each individual is required to know some of the global information, which makes
it less practical. In the network selection problem, for instance, Ref. [2] assumes
that CR users need to know the global information such as xP and xS (the
frequency of PUs and SUs, respectively) in order to select their networks.
3.2 From Individual Behaviours to Population Dynamics
The replicator equations Eq. 4 describe the dynamics at a population level, but
not necessarily specify how each individual should choose a pure strategy [6].
In the original setting of evolutionary biology, the replicator equations describe
the population dynamics arising from a set of individuals replicating themselves
by reproduction in a way proportional to their utilities, not requiring any global
information [3]. Other than reproduction, social learning or imitation of pure
strategies can also yield the replicator population dynamics [7]. The relation
between individual behaviour and population dynamics can be more explicitly
represented in the following form
dxi
dt
=
I∑
j=1
xjρji(x)− xi
I∑
j=1
ρij(x) (5)
where ρij denotes a revision protocol or a conditional switch rate that describes
when and how an individual in the population decide to switch strategy i to j
[8]. The first summation captures the in-flow of individuals switching to strategy
i and the second one, the out-flow of those switching from i to other strategies.
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The revision protocol of pairwise proportional imitation ρij(x) = xj [pij(x)−
pii(x)]+ (where [z]+ = z if z > 0 and [z]+ = 0 if z ≤ 0) yields the replicator
population dynamics of Eq. 4, which can be easily shown by plugging ρij(x) into
Eq. 5 [7]. Note that an individual does need to know the population share xj
for the pairwise imitation. This term in the protocol merely accounts for an
individual to randomly choose an opponent, who of strategy j is selected with
probability xj . The individual imitates the strategy of the opponent only if the
opponent’s utility is higher than his own, doing so with probability proportional
to the utility difference. The pairwise imitation drives the system to a Nash
equilibrium without any need of global information. The imitation protocol
and a variant of it have been recently applied to network-related problems, in
order to reach a Nash equilibrium of the system-wide optimum in distributed
manners [9, 10]. If applied to the network selection problem, thus, the imitation
protocol would yield the Nash equilibrium of network traffic in a more practical
manner than the approach of Ref. [2] does.
4 Imitation-based Network Selection
4.1 Markov Chains
We use a Markov chain to model a population of CR users conducting the
imitation-based network selection. The finite state space of the Markov chain is
FN = {k : 0 ≤ k ≤ N} where k is an integer-valued random variable denoting
the number of PUs among N network users; there are N−k of SUs. The arrival
rate of PUs is λP (k) = λk/N . Since there are only two strategies, the stochastic
evolution can be described by a birth-death process on the one-dimensional finite
state space FN [11]. In each stochastic event, the state variable k can either
remain unchanged or move to k + 1 or k − 1. With transitions only occurring
between adjacent states, the transition probabilities are
T+k =
N − k
N
k
N − 1q
k
S→P , (6)
T−k =
k
N
N − k
N − 1 q
k
P→S, (7)
T 0k = 1− T+k − T−k (8)
where T+k denotes the probability of a transition from state k to k+ 1, T
−
k from
k to k − 1, T 0k remaining in k, qkS→P the probability of an SU imitating a given
PU (i.e. switching to be a PU) when the total number of PUs is k, qkP→S the
probability of a PU imitating a given SU. We assumes a nondecreasing function
q(z) for the imitation probabilities qkS→P = q
(
pikP − pikS
)
and qkP→S = q
(
pikS − pikP
)
.
4.2 Noise-free Imitation
For the noise-free imitation, we have the imitation probability q(z) = 0 for z ≤ 0
and q(z) strictly increasing for z > 0. Under the revision protocol of the pairwise
4
proportional imitation, for instance, we have qkS→P = q
(
pikP − pikS
)
= [pikP − pikS ]+
and qkP→S = q
(
pikS − pikP
)
= [pikS − pikP ]+. Let us define k∗ ≡ dNx∗P e = dNλ∗P/λe
where x∗P denotes the equilibrium point of the replicator equation dxP/dt =
KxP (piP (x)− p¯i(x)), x∗P = λ∗P/λ and dze the least integer greater than or equal
to z. Since piP > piS for xP < x
∗
P , piP = piS for xP = x
∗
P and piP < piS for xP > x
∗
P
from Eq. 1 and 2, we get T−k = 0 for k ≤ k∗−1 and T+k = 0 for k ≥ k∗, assuming
a non-boundary initial state (i.e. k 6= 0, N at time t = 0). Thus, we have the
stationary probability distribution of the system
ψk∗−1 =
T−k∗
T+k∗−1 + T
−
k∗
, ψk∗ =
T+k∗−1
T+k∗−1 + T
−
k∗
, ψk = 0 otherwise. (9)
The deterministic replicator dynamics well approximates the population dy-
namics arising from the imitation-based decision process by individual network
users in the sense that the Nash equilibrium x∗P reached by the replicator dy-
namics well approximates the stationary distribution ψk concentrated around
k = k∗ ≈ x∗PN .
4.3 Noisy Imitation
Although the imitation protocol relaxes the requirement of the global infor-
mation, it still suffers from an unrealistic assumption. It assumes that a user
should never imitate an opponent user of a lower utility. In practice, it is dif-
ficult to strictly meet this assumption of ‘noise-free’ imitation due to various
reasons. In the network selection problem, a user needs to observe and estimate
the expected service delay in the network, which in general deviates from the
ground truth of the expected delay. Being self-interested, an opponent user may
deliberately inform of inaccurate utility information. Thus, it is more realistic
to assume the ‘noisy’ imitation such that a user could imitate an opponent of
lower utility, due to a decision-making based on the error-prone estimations.
For the noisy imitation, we assume that the imitation probability q(z) is
strictly increasing. The key difference from that of the noise-free imitation is
q(z) > 0 even for z ≤ 0, reflecting the possible switch to the other network of
a lower utility although the probability of such suboptimal behaviour is smaller
than that of switching from a network of lower utility to a higher one. Since
we have T+k > 0 and T
−
k > 0 for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N − 1}, the boundary states
k = 0 and k = N are reachable from any other states {1, .., N−1}. We also have
T 00 = T
0
N = 1. Therefore, a Markov chain for the noisy imitation is an absorbing
Markov chain with two absorbing states k = 0 and k = N , which are the only
stationary states. All the other states {1, .., N − 1} are transient, including
k = k∗ − 1 and k = k∗ that would correspond to the Nash equilibrium. In
other words, regardless of the initial state, the noisy imitation leads the system
to end up with either all-SUs (k = 0) or all-PUs (k = N), driving the system
away from the Nash equilibrium. Failing to capture this stochastic effect, the
replicator dynamics is less than adequate to model the network selection process
in the noise-prone realistic situations.
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5 Network Selection with Anchored Users
The absorbing states of all-PUs and all-SUs are not good for the network op-
erators nor CR users. An operator with no CR users of its network collects no
income while CR users suffer from the utility lower than the one that would be
obtained at the Nash equilibrium. Thus, there is a clear need to prohibit the
system from being absorbed in any of the suboptimal states.
5.1 Noisy Imitation with Anchored Users
The boundary states k = 0 and k = N are the absorbing states under the
noisy imitation because there is no individual of a different strategy available
for imitation and hence no change, once in one of the two states. However,
the absorbing states could be avoided if some individuals behave irrespective of
their utility [12, 13]. In the context of the network selection, for instance, if at
least one user for each network never switches the network (irrespective of the
utility) and is always available for imitation by other users, then there would be
no absorbing state. However, it is a strong assumption that anyone among self-
interested users should act like this, which would be a kind of an altruistic act.
On the other hand, it would be rational for a self-interested network operator
to set up ‘puppet’ users that are anchored to the network at the operator’s own
cost since it ensures avoiding the extinction of its genuine users; the anchored
users are always available for imitation by genuine users of the other network.
With the anchored users in place, the transition probabilities are
T+k =
N − k
N
k +AP
N − 1 +AP +AS q
(
pikP − pikS
)
, (10)
T−k =
k
N
N − k +AS
N − 1 +AP +AS q
(
pikS − pikP
)
, (11)
T 0k = 1− T+k − T−k (12)
where AP and AS denote the number of anchored PUs and SUs, respectively.
Note that N and k count only genuine users, but not anchored (puppet) users.
Since T+k > 0 for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and T−k > 0 for k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, it is
possible to go from every state to every state. With the anchored users, hence,
the Markov chain for the noisy imitation is not absorbing anymore, but it is
irreducible. An irreducible Markov chain yields a unique stationary distribution
that indicates the likelihood of finding the population in any particular state in
the long-run. Although it can be generally obtained as the left eigenvector of
the transition matrix with eigenvalue one, the stationary distribution ψk for a
birth-death process with two strategies can be explicitly represented by
ψk = ψ0Π
k
n=1T
+
n−1/T
−
n (13)
where ψ0 is determined by
∑N
k=0 ψk = 1 [?].
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5.2 Stationary Distribution and Nash Equilibrium
With the inclusion of the anchored users, we can not only remove the sub-
optimal absorbing states but also establish a link between the system states of
the noise-free and noisy imitation protocols. For AP = AS = 1, we show that the
peak of the stationary distribution well corresponds to the Nash equilibrium that
the replicator population dynamics arising from the noise-free imitation would
drive the system towards.
Theorem 1. For AP = AS = 1, we have arg maxk∈{0,...,N} ψk = k∗ − 1 or k∗
where k∗ = dNx∗P e = dNλ∗P/λe
Proof. Note that ψk = T
+
k−1/T
−
k ψk−1 since ψk = ψ0Π
k
n=1T
+
n−1/T
−
n = ψ0T
+
k−1/T
−
k Π
k−1
n=1T
+
n−1/T
−
n =
T+k−1/T
−
k ψk−1. Let pi
k
P ≡ piP (k) = α/ (C − λP ) + p1 = α/ (C − λxP ) + p1 =
α/ (C − λk/N)+p1 and pikS ≡ piS(k) = piS = α/ (C − λ)+p2. Note that pikP > pikS
for k/N < λ∗P/λP , pi
k
P = pi
k
S for k/N = λ
∗
P/λP , and pi
k
P < pi
k
S for k/N > λ
∗
P/λP .
For AP = AS = 1, we have T
+
k−1/T
−
k = q
(
pik−1P − pik−1S
)
/q
(
pikS − pikP
)
.
For an integer k ≤ k∗ − 1, we have pikP > pikS . Since q(·) is strictly in-
creasing as well as pik−1P − pik−1S > 0 and pikS − pikP < 0, we have T+k−1/T−k =
q
(
pik−1P − pik−1S
)
/q
(
pikS − pikP
)
> 1, yielding ψk = T
+
k−1/T
−
k ψk−1 > ψk−1. In
other words, ψk increases as k increases as far as k ≤ k∗ − 1 and, hence,
arg maxk∈{0,...,k∗−1} ψk = k∗ − 1.
For k ≥ k∗ + 1, we have pikP < pikS . Since pik−1P − pik−1S ≤ 0 and pikS −
pikP > 0, we have T
+
k−1/T
−
k = q
(
pik−1P − pik−1S
)
/q
(
pikS − pikP
)
< 1, yielding ψk =
T+k−1/T
−
k ψk−1 < ψk−1. Note that ψk∗+1 = T
+
k∗−1/T
−
k∗ψk∗ < ψk∗ holds as well.
In other words, ψk decreases with k for k ≥ k∗ and, hence, arg maxk∈{k∗,...,N} ψk =
k∗.
In conclusion, arg maxk∈{0,...,N} ψk = k∗ − 1 or k∗.
Corollary 1.1. For AP = AS = 1, we have
arg max
k∈{0,...,N}
ψk =

k∗, if |4pik∗−1P,S | > |4pik
∗
P,S|
{k∗ − 1, k∗}, if |4pik∗−1P,S | = |4pik
∗
P,S|
k∗ − 1, if |4pik∗−1P,S | < |4pik
∗
P,S|
where |4pik∗−1P,S | ≡ |pik
∗−1
P − pik
∗−1
S | and |4pik
∗
P,S| ≡ |pik
∗
P − pik
∗
S |.
Proof. Since pikP > pi
k
S for k < k
∗ and pik
∗
P −pik
∗
S ≤ 0, we have pik
∗−1
P −pik
∗−1
S > 0
and pik
∗
S − pik
∗
P ≥ 0.
For pik
∗−1
P −pik
∗−1
S > pi
k∗
S −pik
∗
P , we have T
+
k∗−1/T
−
k∗ = q
(
pik
∗−1
P − pik
∗−1
S
)
/q
(
pik
∗
S − pik
∗
P
)
>
1, yielding ψk∗ = T
+
k∗−1/T
−
k∗ψk∗−1 > ψk∗−1 and, thus, arg maxk∈{0,...,N} ψk =
k∗.
For pik
∗−1
P −pik
∗−1
S = pi
k∗
S −pik
∗
P , we have T
+
k∗−1/T
−
k∗ = q
(
pik
∗−1
P − pik
∗−1
S
)
/q
(
pik
∗
S − pik
∗
P
)
=
1, yielding ψk∗ = T
+
k∗−1/T
−
k∗ψk∗−1 = ψk∗−1 and, hence, arg maxk∈{0,...,N} ψk =
{k∗ − 1, k∗}.
For pik
∗−1
P −pik
∗−1
S < pi
k∗
S −pik
∗
P , we have T
+
k∗−1/T
−
k∗ = q
(
pik
∗−1
P − pik
∗−1
S
)
/q
(
pik
∗
S − pik
∗
P
)
<
1, yielding ψk∗ = T
+
k∗−1/T
−
k∗ψk∗−1 < ψk∗−1 and, thus, arg maxk∈{0,...,N} ψk =
k∗ − 1.
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6 Social Welfare
We need to measure the system efficiency under the noisy imitation with-
out/with anchored users as well as the noise-free imitation.
6.1 Price of Anarchy
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is one of the most popular performance metrics,
quantifying the loss of efficiency as the ratio between the cost of the worst stable
outcome and the cost of the optimal outcome [14]. As in Ref. [2], we define
social welfare S(xP ) = λ [xP/ (C − λxP ) + (1− xP ) / (C − λ)] as the total delay
experienced by PUs and SUs and
PoA = S(x∗P )/Smin (14)
where S(x∗P ) denotes the total delay experienced at the stable equilibrium point
x∗P and Smin = 2
(√
C/(C − λ)− 1
)
is the social optimum of the total delay,
which is obtained at xP where dS/dxP = 0 [2]. For the noisy imitation without
anchored users, we have
PoA =
λ
C − λ
1
Smin
=
λ
2
√
C − λ
(√
C −√C − λ
) (15)
because the two absorbing states (k = 0, N) corresponding to x∗P = 0 and 1 are
the only stable states as well as S(0) = S(1) = λ/ (C − λ),
6.2 Expected Price of Anarchy
Since the noisy imitation with the anchored users yields an irreducible Markov
chain that does not have any equilibrium point, PoA is not suitable as a per-
formance metric. Because an irreducible Markov chain yields a unique station-
ary distribution, we instead use Stationary Expected Social Welfare Eδ[S] =∑N
k=0 S (xP (k))ψi where S (xP (k)) denotes the social welfare when the total
number of PUs is k and xP (k) = k/N [15]. Analogous to PoA, we define the
Expected PoA as
PoAE =
Eδ[S]
Smin
. (16)
Even for the noise-free imitation, PoAE is better suited than PoA because the
long-run state is a stationary probability distribution ψk (Eq. 9) rather than an
equilibrium point due to the discrete nature of the system.
7 Results
We set C = 100, and α = 1 as in Ref. [2].
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Figure 1: The system under the noise-free imitation. (a) The stationary prob-
ability distribution ψk of the number of PUs with an interior initial condition
k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} where N = 10 and λ = 30. The distribution is concentrated
only on k = k∗ − 1 and k = k∗ where k∗ = 7. The dashed vertical line cor-
responds to the Nash equilibrium Nx∗P (≈ 6.8) predicted by the deterministic
replicator equation. (b) PoAE under various traffic λ with N = 10 and 100.
The dashed horizontal line indicates PoAE = 1.1, corresponding to a loss of
efficiency of 10% with respect to the social optimum. The dotted curve indi-
cates PoA of the Nash equilibrium, which tends to be higher than PoAE unless
λ/C ≈ 1 (where C = 100) and N is too small.
7.1 Noise-free vs.Noisy Imitation
Fig. 1 (a) shows the long-run state of a Markov chain under the noise-free imi-
tation protocol. It is well approximated by the Nash equilibrium that the repli-
cator dynamics predicts. Fig. 1 (b) shows the PoAE of the system. We have an
efficient system performance, yielding only a small loss of efficiency with respect
to the social optimum (i.e. PoAE ≈ 1) unless the network traffic λ is too close
to the capacity C and the population size N is too small. Fig. 2 (a) shows the
outcome under the noisy imitation without anchored users. The noisy imita-
tion yields absorbing states of either all-SUs or all-PUs, which the deterministic
replicator dynamics is inadequate to capture. Fig. 2 (b) shows the correspond-
ing PoA that reveals significant loss of efficiency in a wide range of the network
traffic.
7.2 Noisy Imitation with Anchored Users
We use Fermi function q(z) = [1 + exp(−βz)]−1 where β controls the (inverse)
level of noise, which well captures the noisy imitation [16]. Fig. 3 shows the sta-
tionary distributions due to an anchored user set up by each of the two network
operators as well as PoAE . The peak of each distribution well corresponds to
the Nash equilibrium predicted by the replicator population dynamics, being
within the distance 1/N of the Nash equilibrium. The inclusion of the an-
chored users significantly improves the system efficiency under the noisy imita-
tion (i.e. PoAE < 1.1) for a wider range of the traffic than that without anchored
users. The system performance PoAE improves and converges towards PoA of
the Nash equilibrium as the level of noise drops (Fig. 3 (a)) or the population size
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Figure 2: The system under the noisy imitation. (a) Regardless of the initial
state, the system ends up with one of the absorbing states, all-SUs (k = 0) and
all-PUs (k = N) where N = 10 and λ = 30; only the case of all-PUs is shown.
(b) PoA at the absorbing state. The loss of efficiency is significant in a wide
range of the network traffic, e.g. PoA > 1.1 for λ/C > 0.35.
increases (Fig. 3 (b)). Fig. 3 (b) also shows that Gaussian distributions centred
at the Nash equilibrium are good approximations of the stationary distributions,
the distributions being concentrated near the Nash equilibrium. Even if each
user can behave suboptimally, the stationary distribution converges toward that
of an efficient system performance corresponding to the Nash equilibrium.
8 Conclusions
For the network selection game between primary and secondary networks, we
show that requiring only local information, the noise-free imitation among cog-
nitive radio users drives the system to the state well approximated by the Nash
equilibrium of the replicator population dynamics and yields an efficient sys-
tem performance. In more realistic situations, however, the imitation process
becomes noisy and it drives the system away from the Nash equilibrium to the
state of either all-primary users or all-secondary users, resulting in a sub-optimal
system performance. To overcome the sub-optimality of the noisy imitation, we
introduce the notion of anchored network users to be set up by the self-interested
network operators, which yields a stationary distribution peaked at the Nash
equilibrium. It significantly improves the system performance, which converges
towards that of the Nash equilibrium.
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